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Marr and Poggio’s levels of description are one of the most well-known theoretical con-
structs of twentieth century cognitive science. It entails that behavior can and should be
considered at three different levels: computation, algorithm, and implementation. In this
contribution focus is on the computational level of description, the level that describes the
“why” of cognition. I argue that the computational level should be taken as a starting point
in devising experiments in cognitive (neuro)science. Instead, the starting point in empirical
practice often is a focus on the stimulus or on some capacity of the cognitive system.The
“why” of cognition tends to be ignored when designing research, and is not considered in
subsequent inference from experimental results. The overall aim of this manuscript is to
show how re-appreciation of the computational level of description as a starting point for
experiments can lead to more informative experimentation.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1976 Marr and Poggio published an internal MIT memo in
which they coined the levels of description for cognitive andneural
processes (Marr andPoggio,1976). This schemeof descriptionwas
elaboratedbyMarr (1982) inhis bookVision and it is fair to say that
it has had a tremendous inﬂuence on the multidisciplinary ﬁeld
of cognitive science. Here I call for a renewed appreciation and
redeﬁnition of one of these levels of description when designing
and interpreting experiments in cognitive neuroscience.
The levels are the computational level (the goal or the why of
cognition), the level of representation and algorithm, and the level
of physical implementation. As an example Marr (1982) considers
a cash register at a store. The computational level speciﬁes what the
cash register does and why. What it does is addition and the reason
it does addition is that “the rules we intuitively feel to be appro-
priate for combining the individual prices [of purchased items]
in fact deﬁne the mathematical operation of addition” (Marr,
1982, p. 22, my addition). Second, the level of representation
or algorithm, speciﬁes how the cash register performs its com-
putational function, such as using Arabic numbers and starting
with the least signiﬁcant (rightmost) numbers ﬁrst and carrying
them to the next level if the sum exceeds 9. Finally, there is the
implementational level which speciﬁes the device which imple-
ments the computational function of the cash register. This can be
an electronic cash register, but it could also be an abacus (Marr,
1982).
In this contribution I call for a renewed appreciation of the
computational level of description, or the why or goal of a given
behavior. The computational level is inherently context-dependent
and should be taken as the starting point for designing experiments
in cognitive science, as is presently often not the case.
DEFINING THE COMPUTATIONAL LEVEL
In my understanding it is important to stress the context-
dependence of description at the computational level. What a
cognitive systemhas todo andwhy it is doing thiswill vary depend-
ing upon the motivation of the organism and on the context the
behavior occurs in. Context-dependence is often not considered
when specifying the computational goal of a given behavior and
this is probably all right for cases such as a cash register, which
performs the same computational function regardless of con-
text. However, for human cognition viewing the computational
function as context-dependent is key to our understanding and
investigation of cognition.
Consider the computational goal of reading. This depends
heavily on the intention of the reader. Do we read poetry for
relaxation? Are we reading our car’s manual because the lights
are broken? Do we read a scientiﬁc manuscript because we want to
extract themainmessage of the paper, or becausewe have to proof-
read it for spelling errors? Framing the computational goal as “to
read”or“to extract information”is incomplete and uninformative.
Clearly, there is commonality in all instances of reading: the
person perceives visual symbols, recognizes them as words and
sentences and distils meaningful information from the text. This
overlapping part is what gets stressed most often in cognitive sci-
ence. However, to understand cognition we need to take the goal
of the behavior into account and we want this computational level
to be guiding our research. Once we do this, we see that reading
under different circumstances can lead to qualitatively different
behaviors, which are better characterized as arising from different
computational goals than as the outcome of one computational
goal (e.g., Zwaan, 1994; van den Broek et al., 2001; Kaakinen and
Hyönä, 2010).
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Therefore an appropriate description of the computational
level for an organism is one that takes context-dependence into
account: what is the computational goal for the organism at the
present moment? This is a different description than the one
advanced by Marr and Poggio, which is not sensitive to context. It
is possible to deﬁne very high-level context-independent compu-
tational goals such as “survival” or “acting in the world,” but this
seems only informative in framing very general aspects of behavior
(see Discussion). Instead, what we want is a speciﬁcation that can
guide actual empirical research. What is the computational goal
for the organism at the present moment?
THE WHY OF COGNITION AS A STARTING POINT FOR
EXPERIMENTATION
In large part of the literature implicitly there are two strategies for
studying a given topic: stimulus-driven and capacity-driven. I will
describe both research strategies in turn and will illustrate how
taking the computational level of description can lead to differ-
ent experimental manipulations which in turn lead to different
conclusions concerning the research topic under study.
STIMULUS-DRIVEN RESEARCH
Stimulus-driven research takes a certain class of stimuli as starting
point for experiments. The strategy is to “input” the stimulus into
the system and measure a dependent variable (e.g., reaction times)
that relates to processing of the stimulus. The computational goal
for the system then is to process or represent the stimulus. As an
example, consider the study of object perception.
Example: perception of graspable objects
Research shows that observation of graspable/manipulable objects
leads to motor facilitation. For instance, when perceiving a pen or
a coffee mug participants are faster to give a manual response
as compared to when perceiving objects such as a trafﬁc light
or a book case. In neural terms, viewing pictures of manipula-
ble objects leads to increased activation in parts of sensori-motor
cortex involved in actual grasping (see Martin, 2007 for review).
The rationale is that we act upon pens and coffee mugs in order
to use them and that this action is part of our understanding
of such objects. Hence when we perceive them we automatically
activate the action program that we usually use to act upon the
object. In a strong illustration, Tucker and Ellis (2004) showed
that motor facilitation is observed even when an object is pre-
sented very brieﬂy, or when it is visually masked, rendering the
picture invisible.
The emphasis in this line of work is on the stimulus and the
computational level is ﬁxed: perception of a manipulable object
will always lead to computation of motor programs appropriate
for handling the object. If one speciﬁes the computational level
in this way, one will not choose to test context-dependence and
hence the observed effect will appear to be context-invariant. Spec-
ifying the computational level at the level of the organism (“Why
does the organism perceive the object?”) will lead to a different
experimental strategy in investigating object perception.
Tipper et al. (2006) indeed found that activation of a motor
program in response to observation of objects depends upon the
computational goal with which the object is perceived. The shape
of a door handle (round or square-shaped) inﬂuenced reaction
times when participants had to judge the shape of the door han-
dle, but not when they had to judge the color of the door handle.
Action facilitation after object perception only occurs when the
attended property of an object matters for action execution (see
also Bub and Masson, 2006; Girardi et al., 2010; Taylor and Zwaan,
2010).
Setting aside the intricacies of these experiments,what is impor-
tant to realize is that the task manipulation follows naturally from
a speciﬁcation of the computational goal for the participant: how
an object is perceived will depend upon what the perceiver wants
to do with the object. By taking a stimulus-driven approach one
would not consider varying the context in which objects are per-
ceived in a relevant manner, and miss out on an important aspect
of object perception.
In summary, what I argue against is an exclusive focus on the
stimulus in designing experiments. One may object that stimulus-
driven research hardly exists, since most experiments in cognitive
science do employ a behavioral task. That is, the participant is
often doing something, so there is a “Why of cognition.” The
task is often merely used as a way to get a dependent variable
(e.g., RT), or to make sure participants do not fall asleep (in
neuroimaging). The task is detached from a reasonably realis-
tic goal in the real world. For instance, in my own research, I
asked participants to press a button when they saw a repeti-
tion of a picture of a face within a task block (Willems et al.,
2010). This task was only added to make sure that participants
would look at the screen and remain attentive. The results of
the study are subsequently extrapolated to face perception per se,
actively ignoring the task factors under which face perception
was measured. The task limits the conclusion we can draw from
this research: it describes what happens when a face picture falls
on the retina under these restricted circumstances. On the con-
trary, it seems better to treat face perception not as one of a
kind, but to consider how the intention of the perceiver inﬂu-
ences face perception (e.g., Cohen Kadosh et al., 2010). Ideally,
focus should not be only on the stimulus, but also the imple-
mented task should be ecologically valid. That is, it should be
driven by consideration of what we actually do during real life face
perception.
CAPACITY-DRIVEN RESEARCH
Capacity-driven research investigates a cognitive capacity and
extrapolates from this to explain a phenomenon at large. The ratio-
nale is that by investigating a restricted capacity of the system one
gains insight into its “regular” functioning. The problem with this
type of research is that the computational level is not speciﬁed at
the level of the present goal for the organism, but is inspired by a
given capacity of the system.
Example: recursion and embedding in sentence comprehension
Humans are capable of creating and understanding syntactic
structures exhibiting recursion. Consider this example:
“The mailman and the mother of Jim love the woman who Kate
burnt” (Santi and Grodzinsky, 2007, p. 10)
We are able to ﬁnd out who did what to whom because we are
able to process these recursive structures and it has been claimed to
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be the unique feature distinguishing humans from other animals
(Hauser et al., 2002). This inspired research looking into neural
processes underlying the processing of recursive sentences (e.g.,
Friederici et al., 2006; Santi and Grodzinsky, 2007).
The capacity-driven perspective deﬁnes the main task of the
language user to reconstruct the underlying syntactic structure
of an utterance: it places emphasis on the fact that we have this
capacity. In the example above, the task for the system is to
engage in syntactic analysis in order to ﬁnd out who did what
to whom. In this perspective the computational goal is ﬁxed: we
always engage in reconstruction of the underlying syntactic struc-
ture in order to understand the sentence. Similarly, if I hear the
sentence “You guys going anywhere tonight?” the cognitive sys-
tem may compute the “correct” syntactic structure capturing this
sentence, including a representation of the omitted verb phrase
“are.”
Alternatively we can conceive of language as a means of effec-
tively sharing and communicating intentions, in this case the
intention being that the other person wants to know where we
are going. In the latter formulation, a full reconstruction of the
underlying syntactic representation of the sentence is not needed
and does not (necessarily) take place.
Ferreira and colleagues show that indeed the language sys-
tem regularly does not engage in extensive syntactic analysis. For
instance, participants give the wrong answer to the question who
the agent is in sentences like “The dog was bitten by the man,”
even though they are not under time pressure to respond and
they clearly spot the anomaly when asked to (Ferreira, 2003).
This suggests that extensive syntactic analysis is not obligatory
and perhaps not as regularly performed as suggested by the line
of research which places strong emphasis on recursion. Instead
of relying on syntactic analysis the system probably uses heuris-
tics that are applied when reading this type of sentences and does
not compute the underlying syntactic structure (see Ferreira et al.,
2002; Ferreira and Patson, 2007 for extensive discussion).
The take home message from this example is that a seemingly
sensible study object, becomes less sensible once we consider the
computational goal of language comprehension. What looks like
a corner stone of language to some, may turn out to be an inter-
esting anomaly, with very limited relevance to the understanding
of language comprehension.
Different researchers will argue for different characteriza-
tions of the computational goal of language comprehension1.
Whatever the correct answer is, such discussion does not arise
until one formulates the computational level of description.
After formulation of the computational goal of language under-
standing, experimental manipulations can follow naturally from
this description. This is an importantly different route than
take the fact that the system has a given capacity (understand-
ing syntactically very complex sentences) as starting point for
experimentation.
1But note that there is evidence which suggests that that recursion is not as vital to
language understanding as suggested. Corpus work shows that sentences with long-
range (wh-)dependencies are a subset of language, that (a) are hardly ever used and
(b) share a range of common characteristics not at the syntactic level (for instance
they are almost always used with “think”Verhagen, 2010).
Is capacity-driven research at the level of algorithm?
In defense of capacity-driven research one could argue that such
research is at the level of the algorithm. Research on syntacti-
cally very complex sentences shows how the brain deals with
syntactic complexity in language. This is of course true. If one’s
research goal lies in characterizing what happens at the algorith-
mic level of description, it is legitimate to do. Conclusions based
upon capacity-driven research are almost never conﬁned to the
algorithmic level, but presented as providing information about
the cognitive phenomenon at large. This is a mistake and con-
sideration of the computational level of description would lead
to experimentation which is more informative for understanding
cognition.
WHAT I AM NOT CLAIMING
I argued that the why of cognition should be the starting point for
designing experiments. I gave examples of how present research
tends to take a stimulus or a given capacity of the cognitive system
as a starting point instead.
Before I conclude, a few things I am not claiming:
STIMULUS- OR CAPACITY-DRIVEN RESEARCH IS “UNINTERESTING”
That some research is stimulus- or capacity-driven does not imply
that the research is not interesting. It may be interesting for
those interested in response properties of single neurons or for
understanding mechanisms of lateral inhibition, to study these
phenomena. There is nothing inherently wrong with studying
the response to isolated stimuli such as faces, lines, or to look
at what happens when participants read syntactically difﬁcult
sentences.
My main objections are that (i) researchers should clearly spec-
ify why they study what they study and (ii) that the conclusions
drawn from research should be conﬁned to the experimental set-
ting under which the data are acquired. So if you study single cell
responses to single lines, you need to come up with a strong link-
ing hypothesis in order to argue that the ﬁndings are relevant to
understanding visual perception as it is (Teller, 1984).
THERE IS NO SPECIALIZATION IN THE COGNITIVE SYSTEM
“Context-dependence” does not mean that a given brain region
can do any type of computation. There is clearly specialization
in the brain, the extent of which is a matter of ongoing debate.
Indeed, there may be neurons in visual cortex that perform the
computation “edge detection.” This tells us something about the
response properties of these neurons, but has very limited conse-
quences for our understanding of visual perception as it is for the
organism in the world2.
Moreover,properties of low-level visual regions can changedra-
matically depending on the behavioral state (Lamme et al., 1998;
Pack et al., 2001) or time window at which the neuron is assessed
(Lamme and Roelfsema, 2000; Pack and Born, 2001).
2Or, as Olshausen and Field put it: “Our theories need to be guided by functional
considerations and an appreciation for the ambiguities contained in natural images,
rather than appealing to simplistic notions of feature detection that are suggested
by a select population of recorded neurons using reduced stimuli.” (Olshausen and
Field, 2005, pp. 1675–1676).
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CONCEPTUALIZATION SHOULD BE COMPLETE BEFORE EMPIRICAL
RESEARCH CAN START
It is easy to take remarks on deﬁning the computational goal to an
extreme by demanding that every cognitive phenomenon under
study must ﬁrst be fully and precisely deﬁned through conceptual
analysis (Bennett and Hacker, 2003). This is not my intention.
Empirical research does inﬂuence conceptualization just as con-
ceptual analysis does steer empirical research. They do and should
go hand in hand.
COGNITIVE (NEURO)SCIENCE IS A MESS
I painted a relatively bleak picture of experimentation in cogni-
tive (neuro)science. Exaggeration is an effective rhetorical strategy,
and not all experimentation in the ﬁeld ignores the computational
goal in designing experiments, as the informed reader will surely
be aware of. One example is recent work in action observation,
which explicitly manipulates the goal for the observer (e.g., Spunt
et al., 2010; see also Brass et al., 2007; de Lange et al., 2008; Ortigue
et al., 2010).
THIS IDEA IS NOVEL
For the purpose of readability I have not referred to other schol-
ars who have coined related ideas. The present proposal bears
often obvious links to (among others) Dennett’s intentional stance
position (Dennett, 1987), situated or embodied cognition (Clark,
1997; Gallagher, 2005; Barsalou, 2008; Robbins andAydede, 2008),
situated robotics (Brooks, 1991; Pfeifer and Bongard, 2007), prag-
matics (Sperber and Wilson, 1986; Clark, 1996; Levinson, 2000),
visual science (Gibson, 1966, 1979; O’Regan and Noe, 2001; Noe,
2004), and other reformulations of Marr’s scheme (e.g., Shallice,
1988). I hope that framing of the idea and the relation to the exam-
ples we gave will help in getting the idea of functional relevance
to work in the practices of cognitive neuroscience. I apologize to
those whose work should have been mentioned in this list.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
“What under normal circumstances this organism is never con-
fronted with is the pure stimulus, free from all interpretation”
(Berthoz and Petit, 2008, p. 20).
The study of cognition is plagued with research traditions that
effectively ignore the why of cognition. A lot of emphasis is put
on the stimulus, or focus is on some capacity of the system. The
existence of a stimulus or of a given capacity of the system should
never be taken as the starting point for research. To paraphrase
Berthoz andPetit: if the organism is never confrontedwith thepure
stimulus, why pretend to study the response to a pure stimulus?
In my opinion cognition cannot be appropriately understood
without taking context into account. This precludes a description
at the computational level which is an exhaustive description for
all occurrences of a cognitive process. So, general characteriza-
tion can serve as a shorthand and guiding principle for research
(e.g., “vision is for action,” or “language is to establish truth con-
ditions”), but an adequate description at the computational level
should not treat cognition as something which occurs invariantly,
or in the void.
A different and popular way of phrasing the computational
level is at the level of a given subpart of the system, such as a brain
region. For instance, the computational goal of the fusiform face
area is to perform computations necessary for a perceiver to recog-
nize or perceive a face. Here one ascribe functions to a subpart of
a system, when in fact they are functions of the system as a whole
(Bennett and Hacker, 2003; Wheeler, 2005 for discussion). If one
believes that brain regions perform one circumscribed function,
every single time this cognitive function is performed, one will
focus on commonalities of neural responses in different experi-
mental situations (cf. Mesulam, 1990, 1998). By doing this, it is
easy to miss out on the ﬂexibility of the system as a whole, because
such differences are essentially brushed aside in favor of focus on
the common aspect of neural responses. On the other hand, if one
takes ﬂexibility of localization seriously, it will become an impor-
tant experimental question under which circumstances a given set
of brain regions supports a cognitive process and under which
circumstances the network is slightly (or not so slightly) different.
Formulating the why of cognition will help in phrasing the rel-
evant experimental manipulations to investigate the ﬂexibility of
involvement of brain areas in parts of cognition, and to see if our
hypothesis on cognitive function is correct or not (see Willems
and Casasanto, 2011 for an example from language research).
In conclusion, I hope that these remarks will motivate
researchers to ask this question: what do I think the goal of a
given behavior is, and how is this going to inﬂuence the way in
which I do my experiment?
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